I didn't unilaterally declare independence – Varadaraja Perumal

(By Dilrukshi Handunnetti)
 
A revolutionary Tamil youth, who co-founded the Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF) in 1979 and later became the Chief Minister of the merged North-East Provincial Council, Varadaraja Perumal, still believes the two provinces should be merged at a referendum where the voters of the island's Eastern Province makes the political decision, according to constitutional provisions. In a wide-ranging interview with Ceylon Today, Perumal, who is self-exiled in India, speaks about collaborations between the Sri Lankan Government and the LTTE that caused the collapse of the North-East Provincial Council and for him to flee the country, fearing for his life. Perumal denies unilaterally declaring an independent State of Eelam and deems it as the propaganda work of the Sri Lankan State and the LTTE to undermine the process of devolution that had just begun and says, the Provincial Council system is in crisis not simply due to insufficient power sharing but erroneous interpretations of the Constitution itself.
Following are excerpts:
 
 Q:
What was your gut reaction to the setting up of a Northern Provincial Council, at long last?
 
A: I felt sad when the United North-East Provincial Council Administration was bifurcated.
Whether the separation of the North and the East is going to be a permanent one – or the two will one day be merged again – shall be determined by the future political moves in Sri Lanka and not by any person or group temporarily in power.
 

However, it is good that now there are functioning Provincial Councils, elected by the people in these provinces.
Had the Northern Provincial Council been established immediately after the end of war in the latter part of 2009 or early part of 2010 that would have proved a home-grown achievement of the Government of Sri Lanka, without any pressure from India or Western countries.
 
 
Q: Are you satisfied with the electoral process and the results of September 2013?
 
A: Definitely. It is obvious that perfection in any electoral politics is impossible. However, it was nearer to a free and fair election.
 

Beyond everything, the enthusiasm and response shown by the Northern Province citizens in voting should not be underestimated. End result of the election was not much different from the general expectations and calculations, except the numbers of preferential votes, whereby the people of the North have conveyed important messages to the TNA and to the government.
 

Q: Is it too little too late or are you satisfied that sufficient power has been devolved to the North, heeding a longstanding call for sharing power?
 
A: The Provincial Councils existing in Sri Lanka are yet to be set to perform their responsibility assigned by the Constitution of Sri Lanka – 'Holy Law of the Land' – towards its people.
 

Powers of an institution will reflect in its efficiency and effectiveness – its performance. There is a substantial difference between the answers to the questions whether (a) the powers given to the Provincial Council are sufficient or not and (b) whether the Provincial Councils are given powers or not.
 

It is a generally known fact that the powers assigned to the Provincial Councils by the Constitution of Sri Lanka, which by solemn oath should be respected and upheld first by the President of Sri Lanka – are not only fully but not at all dutifully applied and practised in compliance with the provisions of the law, except from time to time, elect members to these bodies.
 

Major crisis in making the Provincial Councils and the governments thereof are prevalent not due to the insufficiency of the powers to the Provincial Councils but due to totally erroneous interpretation and implementation of the constitutional provisions, particularly with regard to the executive powers of the elected Chief Minister and Provincial Ministers.
 

It is common sense that further delay on the part of the Sri Lankan leaders in power, in fulfilling their own promises in their own land to their own people would voluntarily and inevitably warrant external intervention, regardless of the powers of the President, members in Parliament and the strength of the armed forces and camps.
 
 
Q: Do you feel there should not have been a de-merger of the North and the East, and instead, power should have been devolved to an amalgamated Northeast?
 

A: The matter regarding the merger of the Northern and Eastern Provinces have become very complicated. So many practical issues have further cropped up in the debate of merger.
In the present circumstances, pro or against merger means little to the existing political parties in Sri Lanka except a platform to pursue their self-interests and slogans.
 

Leave aside the issue of the merger. Even to establish unity and harmony among communities, ensure their dignity and respect their due share in each province, there should be realignment of territories and readjustment of administration in each province. Otherwise, the provincial administrations would produce no use but further communal divides and conflicts which would feed to the parasitical extremists and paranoid chauvinists.
In principle, I stand for the merger. I totally disagree with those who stand and shout against a United North East Province because their arguments completely lack rationality, fairness and substance, but based on the mind-set of majoritarian arrogance, racial superiority and hegemonic attitudes.
 

The decision whether the Northern and Eastern Provinces should be united or separated is left with the people of the Eastern Province to determine at a Referendum – the constitutional provision of which was often highlighted by many 'care takers' – as it was the basic right of the Eastern Province people. But, after the bifurcation this has been carefully and conveniently hidden or thrown away deliberately from the political agenda with ulterior motive.
 
 
Q: In hindsight, do you regret fleeing the island and giving up your post as Chief Minister of the North-East Province?
 
A: I consider this to be the most crucial question among all your questions. I have a lengthy answer.
The role of Chief Minister of the North-East Province was left on my shoulder by very unusual political circumstances developed in Sri Lanka, which we – my leader, my party men, supporters and alliance partners – considered a historical challenge.
 

We have strived, struggled and sacrificed to achieve the devolution of powers to the Provincial Councils and make them function efficiently and effectively, so that the dynamic process for progress of ethnic unity, economic development and peoples' democracy could be achieved.
 

I am proud of the role that I played in a short span of time, which is still remembered by the people of Sri Lanka, even after 25 years. My comrades and I were so young, but we tried our best to contribute with foresight, mindful of the need of the people and for the future of Sri Lanka.
 

I wish to appropriately quote the situation in which we played our role – from a writing of my former comrade and ministerial colleague, Dayan Jayatilleka – from the letter dated 6 March 1989 informing me of his resignation from the post of Minister of the North-East Province:
 

'The fact that the embryonic State and government structures in the North East are being set up under the umbrella of a foreign state, admittedly as a sad necessity, resulting from Sinhala chauvinist myopia as well as the weaknesses of the Sinhala and Tamil Left (despite our best and joint efforts and sacrifices), renders my continued incumbency as Minister a further source of alienation from my people. That a major task of the democratic revolution, to wit, the democratization through the system of Provincial Councils, of the over-centralized Colonial state structure we inherited from imperialism could not have taken place without the intervention of India, is something that we Sri Lankans have to acknowledge.'
 

It is also appropriate to quote his commentary opinion about my role, in the same letter:
'This resignation should not in any way be taken as a critique of your Chief Ministership, or of the Provincial Government. You have proved yourself a dynamic and extremely capable Chief Minister – I should say, an excellent one. You are also known, respected and regarded with affection by the progressive masses of the South. I fervently hope that you will have the political clarity and wisdom to avoid the Scylla of collaboration with the bourgeois state and the UNP regime on the one hand, and the charydis of Tamil chauvinism in both its Eelamist and 'Cyprusizationist' variants, on the other.'
 

However, the politico-military environment was entirely polluted with the beginning of the collaboration between President Premadasa and Prabhakaran.
 

As many of the then political leaders knew, they did all preparations in all out co-operation in making arrangement to eliminate my party men as many as possible and to ensure complete collapse of the North-East Provincial Council system.
 

In India, Rajiv Gandhi lost power in the 1989 General Election and Prime Minister V.P. Singh's foreign policy on Sri Lanka was directed by the then Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu, Muthuvel Karunanidhi, who was under the complete influence of the LTTE.
 

The then President R. Premadasa, Indian Premier V.P. Singh and the Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu – from their three power centres – in order to please and comfort the LTTE, compelled me in different form to dissolve the Provincial Council and resign from the Chief Minister post. From Southern Sri Lanka, no leader then had political and physical strength to lend us a helping hand or offer co-operation. This may be because, by then, JVP terrorism and counter terrorism by the Sri Lankan State was ruling the South.
 

The LTTE too was provided with weapons and freedom to kill Tamil leaders, including those who were staying in Colombo like Appapillai Amirthalingam, V. Yogeswaran, Sam Thambimuttu and so on. It is sad to recall that the Sri Lankan Security Forces and the LTTE cadres were claiming to be brothers of one nation, but in reality, they were comrades in the field of destroying the process of democracy and devolution.
We (the EPRLF members and allied partners) had no option but to leave Sri Lanka due to the compelling situation, at least temporarily, with a clear and strong message to Sri Lankan leaders and the Government of India, who convinced us through many promising words and deeds, to drop the slogan for an Independent Eelam and desist from continuing the armed struggle.
 

There was no space left for me or my comrades to stay in Sri Lanka. Had I not left Sri Lanka then, I would have become a photograph 25 years ago. Today you would not be able to interview me and everybody would have forgotten me, except my family members, some comrades and friends.
 
 
Q: What caused you to raise a flag to unilaterally declare independence before fleeing? In retrospect, do you consider it was irrational, emotional or the appropriate political response?
 
A: Let me say that there was not at all any flag-hoisting or a unilateral declaration of independence of Eelam.
During my tenure as Chief Minister, I had hoisted only two flags – one was the Sri Lankan National Flag on 4 February 1989. I was told that particular video was happily watched and applauded by President Premadasa and many of his Cabinet colleagues at the President's House, for my good gesture. But that was not reciprocated by the President and his ministers in their responses in the matter of devolving powers. That was entirely a different story. The other flag-hoisting by me was when I raised the North-East Provincial Council flag, which is now the official flag of the Northern Province.
 

When everything was about to collapse due to the opportunistic honeymoon between Premadasa and Prabhakaran, the Provincial Council lead by me submitted 19 points – demands for making real progress in the process of devolution.
President Premadasa did not respond to them at all but gave the list of demands to the LTTE for consideration and their decision. On the one hand, President Premadasa was responsive to and comfortable with subservient 'yes men' and on the other, with the Eelam separatists but not with those who had been really striving and struggling for a reasonable political solution within a united Sri Lanka.
 

We also had to respond in a way he understood. I have, in the response above, elaborated the circumstances that led us to leave Sri Lanka with an effective political message for its leaders.
I must acknowledge one grave mistake. We failed in marketing the letter with 19 demands when President Premadasa and Prabhakaran collaborated in their massive maligning campaign. I recall, even comrade Vasudeva Nanayakkara made an immediate statement, condemning us for unilaterally declaring independent Eelam, without referring to a single one of those 19 points.
Even in your question, it appears that the memory built by the collaborators of a hate campaign among the Sinhala people against me, is still predominant. So the Eelam flag theory is a follow up of imagination stemming from political ignorance.
There had been no Eelam flag as such among the Tamils, except the flags of political groups and parties, including the LTTE.
 
 
Q: What steps did you take to ensure that the North-eastern Provincial Council was able to function? How responsive was Colombo to your demands?
 
A: I assumed office as the Chief Minister on 10 December 1988 and continued till 15 March 1990 – 15 months in total – or exactly 460 days.
In April 1989, an unholy alliance of convenience was formed between President Premadasa and Prabhakaran. Both began to use their strengths and stocks, to disturb and destruct the functioning of the Provincial Council.
 

However, we were able to lay a strong foundation for provincial administration, which was not in existence by then.
 

The present structures and foundations of the Northern and Eastern provincial administrations have been largely built on the hard work we did during that short time.
How the Government of Sri Lanka under President Premadasa's leadership responded to the North-East Provincial Council is well-known and also documented.
I, together with my ministerial colleagues and the secretaries of the Provincial administration, tried our best to ensure there was devolution of powers to the provinces in each subject. We pursued this at meetings with politicians and officials of the Central Government, notwithstanding our apprehensions and public statements about the inadequacies in the 13th Amendment and the Provincial Council system.
 

President Premadasa also was – to an extent – positively responding until he agreed to the LTTE's terms. This Premadasa-Prabhakaran alliance caused a great reversal. We effectively had just six months and then it was a struggle for survival.
 
 
Q: Do you think India could have intervened to ensure the continuity of the North-Eastern Provincial Council?
 
A: Had Rajiv Gandhi been not killed, such possibilities could have been contemplated. India could not have done anything because the LTTE did want anything to be done by anyone, including the continuity of a united Northern and Eastern Province.
Former President Chandrika Bandaranaike offered a near federal set-up including a United North-East. But the LTTE sabotaged her every effort. Former Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe could have ensured full federalism, had the LTTE co-operated with his effort.
Until the Mavilaru episode, President Mahinda Rajapaksa too was ready to consider LTTE positions, except separation and terrorism. Then the Sri Lankan Armed Forces captured Kilinochchi – the LTTE's powerbase. Now it is too bleak to project any possibilities. However, basic decision towards the unity of the North and Eastern Provinces should be determined by the people thereof and not by anyone else, may it be the Colombo powerbase or elsewhere in the World.
 
 
Q: Should land and police powers, so far resisted by Colombo, be devolved?
 
A: Most definitely yes.
If police powers are – though very limited as per the 13th Amendment – not devolved, then the executive powers assigned to the Provincial Councils would significantly reduce the legislative powers, making it redundant and impracticable. Otherwise, the provincial administrations can be made meaningful only when the people of the province elect persons from the party in power of the Sri Lankan State.
It is well known that the State-aided Sinhala colonization schemes – not the Sinhala peoples' economic or other settlements on their own – have been a major reason fuelling ethnic disputes in Sri Lanka for the last 60 years.
 
 
Q: Why do you continue to live in India?
A: Some 25 years of living here has rooted me deeply in India. My daughters have grown and married, my sons-in-law are Indians and I have grandchildren.
 

So, my personal life and relations have taken inalienable shapes here and formed ties with India, though my heart beats for Sri Lanka. This is not just about me but for millions of Sri Lankans living abroad.
 
 
President Rajapaksa's younger brothers have returned to Sri Lanka because their brother became the President of Sri Lanka. Otherwise they wouldn't have. I also will be back soon when time and circumstances necessitate it.
 
 
Q: With all the political changes taking place – in Sri Lanka's North in particular – why have you, unlike many others, not sought a role to contribute to post-war development?
A: I was never a routine electoral politician and I don't want to change myself in order to fit myself into such a political game.
 

My role in Sri Lankan politics was based on principles, ideology and people- oriented goals. It was not for mustering power, money or muscle to achieve personal goals.
 

I am capable of understanding the rules and the nuances of the politics of power and or position. But I am incapable and also not desirous, may be because of the nostalgia caused by my own history, to adjust and accommodate myself into existing North and East politics. I tried to contribute to the devolution process during President Kumaratunga's time but nothing was achieved.
Ranil Wickremesinghe tried to influence me to come over but I did not wish to get involved. The war has taken a violent turn by then.
 

Following the war's end, I visited Sri Lanka many times – between 2010 and 2012 – to explore the possibilities of making a contribution. But I found the post-war politics among the Tamils, a vastly different ball game, not comparable to our time in the 1970s and 80s.
Politics is an art of handling of and dealing with opportunities, so let me wait till changes take place that may provide me with the opportunity to serve my people.