Ex Jaffna Commander speaks out

Focus on Tamil Diaspora, LTTE fighting cadre, IPKF memorial and Indian strategy

By Shamindra Ferdinando

A despicable LTTE decision to exterminate rival Tamil groups had the blessings of an influential section of the Tamil Diaspora and Indian officialdom, retired Brigadier Hugh Fred Rupesinghe says. Rupesinghe says during his tenure as the senior most officer in Jaffna in the 80s, he had offered protection to TELO (Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization) leader Sri Sabaratnam at any Army camp in the peninsula, though the LTTE killed Sabaratnam along with several dozens of TELO cadres. At that time, TELO had been the dominant group. The one-time Jaffna Security Forces Commander says those who now target Sri Lanka on the human rights front turned a blind eye to LTTE atrocities, though Sri Lanka repeatedly called for Western intervention.

Rupesinghe says the deployment of the Indian Army here had been part of their strategy to undermine the Sri Lankan state and give the LTTE an opportunity to establish an administration faithful to New Delhi. Had the LTTE not declared war on the Indian Army following the arrest of an LTTE group early Oct. 1987 by the Sri Lankan Navy, they could have achieved eelam. India had no option but to prop up Varatharaja Perumal’s EPRLF due to Prabhakaran going off the track. India went to the extent of secretly negotiating with the LTTE, while its Army battled the LTTE under extremely difficult conditions.

The following is part II of an exclusive interview with the old soldier, who had been formerly with the Artillery, one of the oldest regiments of the Sri Lankan Army (SLA). We carried part I of the interview on Mar. 1, 2011.

The Island: In spite of the LTTE losing its conventional military clout in May 2009, the LTTE rump and a section of the Tamil Diaspora are pursuing Prabhakaran’s macabre eelam project. President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s government is under heavy pressure by the international community to reach an understanding with them to pave the way for a post-war settlement. Can there be peace and understanding with those still believing in a separate state divided on ethnic lines?

Rupesinghe: The Tamil Diaspora will not easily give up its objective, though losing the LTTE’s military capability. Let me put it this way. Initially India and the Tamil Diaspora spearheaded the eelam project. Without Indian support, the LTTE and other terrorist groups couldn’t have established links with other countries at the onset of their campaign. After the LTTE-IPKF war (Oct. 1987-March 1990), the LTTE and the Diaspora conducted illegal overseas operations on their own.  Now that the LTTE military machine is gone, the Diaspora will pursue its campaign, which will mainly depend on Western powers and a section of the NGOs and the media. The ongoing media ‘blitz’ targeting Sri Lanka is evidence of their strategy. The media is trying to off-set the loss of the Tigers’ conventional military capability.

The Island: Describe the Diaspora role in the’ 80s…

Rupesinghe: The Diaspora and the then Chennai-based Advisory Committee of the LTTE pursued a multi-pronged campaign to achieve eelam. The LTTE’s fighting cadre was nothing but a tool at the disposal of decision makers in neighboring India and Tamil leaders, particularly intellectuals. They oversaw the massacre of rival Tamil groups by the LTTE, though a section of the Indian officialdom initially favoured another group over the LTTE.

A two-day conference held in California in July 1991 revealed that their move to establish a Tamil Nation in Sri Lanka on the false premise that a nation of Tamil Eelam existed in pre-historic times inhabited by Tamils only. Professor Kopalan Mahadeva authored a report captioned Tamils a Nation without a State carried by the Tamil Times of Aug. 15, 1991, which dealt with the California Conference. Unfortunately, successive Sri Lankan governments failed to realize the danger posed by the Diaspora, thereby allowing it to advance its strategy. New York-based lawyer V. Rudrakumaran, the self appointed Prime Minister of the Tamil Eelam Transnational Government (TETG) now pushing for a referendum here on the basis of the one held in Sudan under the aegis of the UN, is spearheading the original Diaspora strategy. Don’t forget that Rudrakumaran was a key member in LTTE negotiating teams over a period of time.

The Island: Can the media offset the loss of the LTTE’s military capability?

Rupesinghe: Over one and half years after the conclusion of the war, the victorious government armed forces are still under pressure. Well funded NGO operatives based here and abroad and the likes of Colonel R. Hariharan, now retired and formerly of the Indian Army continue to undermine Sri Lanka. For want of an effective system and the failure on the part of the government, so-called experts carry on Sri Lanka bashing. Then there are other experts, who conveniently joined the government though they never believed the Sri Lankan military could destroy the LTTE. They felt the Sri Lankan military will never be able to match the LTTE’s fighting cadre, which survived one of the world’s largest armies.

The Island: What made New Delhi to destabilize Sri Lanka?

Rupesinghe: India feared the US making a move on the strategic Trincomalee port in the backdrop of the Cold War. It was a different era. India took advantage of Tamil militancy to interfere in Sri Lanka and in the’ 80s, created conditions favourable to launch overt operations in support of Sri Lankan terrorist groups. India felt by helping one group to establish control in the Northern and Eastern Provinces, it could lay its hands on the Trincomalee harbor. Had that happened, the harbour at Kankesanthurai would have been theirs without a shot being fired. Trincomalee was a powerful inducement. The bottom line is that India destabilized Sri Lanka to deploy its Army here on the pretext of maintaining law and order. India planned to remain here until it set up a puppet administration in the temporary merged Northern and Eastern Provinces. After the collapse of the relationship between India and the LTTE, the former brought the EPRLF and other Tamil groups to the limelight. India facilitated the EPRLF take-over of the North-East Provincial Council and went to the extent of training so-called Tamil National Alliance (TNA) after the then President Ranasinghe Premadasa demanded the withdrawal of the Indian Army. The point is, India made a desperate bid to stay in control of the situation even as it gradually pulled out troops. The last Indian Army contingent withdrew in March 1990 from Trincomalee and this writer had an opportunity to go on board the Indian Navy ship taking the last jawans.

The Island:  Were you involved with the Indian Army during its deployment here?

Rupesinghe: I functioned as a liaison officer with the Indian Army. The LTTE and the IPKF worked together and there was absolutely no doubt about that. Their working relationship remained intact from the day of the Indian deployment in Sri Lanka until the seizure of an LTTE trawler in the first week of Oct.1987. India’s failure to force Sri Lanka to release Kumarappa and Pulendran along with their colleagues, led to ‘Operation Pawan’ which forced the LTTE to flee Jaffna.

During the Indian Army-LTTE honeymoon, the Indian military looked the other way while terrorists engaged in atrocities. The IPKF allowed the LTTE to carry out attacks targeting Muslims and Sinhalese in the East and some parts of the Northern Province. Sri Lankan troops and police were confined to bases, though I had an opportunity to travel to various trouble spots as I liaised with the Indian Army.

Once I attended a meeting at the Kalmunai police station in the immediate aftermath of an LTTE attack on Muslims in the town, despite the Indian Army being responsible for security. It transpired during the meeting that the Indian Army deliberately delayed moving into the scene until the LTTE achieved its destructive target. The delayed arrival was deliberate to support and afford maximum time for ethnic cleansing. The situation in Trincomalee was worse. In spite of Sri Lanka’s protests, the Indian Army and the LTTE pressed ahead with such operations.

The Island: Was there any clear evidence of Indian Army collusion with the LTTE?

Rupesinghe: A ceremony in Jaffna, where the LTTE handed over some weapons at the onset of the Indo-Lanka Accord revealed their strategy. The weapons handed over in the presence of the Indian Army top brass in Sri Lanka were mostly unserviceable weapons. Col. Hariharan, who had been with Indian Intelligence at that time, couldn’t have been unaware of the farce perpetrated by India. Today, Hariharan is shedding crocodile tears for over 1,200 Indian officers and men killed in action in Sri Lanka. Had India disarmed the LTTE as promised, thousands of lives would have been saved. In spite of the bloodshed caused by Indian intervention, Col. Hariharan called for a fresh Indian initiative here in an article captioned ‘Time has come for fresh Indian initiative in Sri Lanka’ in May 2008 at the height of the war on the Vanni front. In fact, I never expected anyone, especially a person fully aware of the Indian intervention here to suggest a fresh initiative. The idea is repulsive, though the two countries should work together in post-war recovery projects in the Northern and Eastern Provinces. It is no secret that Sri Lanka received Indian support during eelam war IV and continues to engage in major rehabilitation and reconstruction projects here. At the time Col. Hariharan called for a fresh Indian intervention, the SLA was still fighting on the Vanni west front and strong LTTE forces remained operational on the Vanni East front. Those who believed in the LTTE fighting capability felt the SLA would never be able to regain Kilinochchi. The liberation of Kilinochchi in Jan. 2009 silenced pro-LTTE experts.

The Island: What do you think of putting up a memorial for the Indian Army in Colombo?

Rupesinghe: The Indian Army had to make tremendous sacrifices due to strategic blunders caused by Indian officialdom. The Army is responsible for many atrocities during its deployment here. Dr. T. Somasekaram of Jaffna, in an article captioned ‘Memorial for IPKF’ carried by The Island on its March 23, 2004 issue exposed India. Somasekaram launched a scathing attack on the Indian Army, while criticizing the then Sri Lankan government’s decision to put up a memorial. The doctor went onto reveal the names of 68 doctors, nurses and patients massacred at the Jaffna Hospital by the Indian Army and the local and foreign media weren’t allowed near some areas, where military operations were on.

The Island: A section of the international community has accused Sri Lanka of killing thousands of civilians in the last phase of the war. As a one-time commander of Jaffna Security Forces, would you believe in such allegations or support calls for an international  war crimes probe?

Rupesinghe: They are unsubstantiated allegations. Whatever the critics say, we never adopted a policy of deliberate killing of civilians though during military operations deaths occurred among civilians. But those demanding an investigation are responsible for far worse war crimes in many parts of the world, including Iraq and Afghanistan.