Sri Lankan crisis: how India can help find a way out

It may be the endgame for the LTTE and Prabakaran but is certainly not the endgame for the Tamils of Sri Lanka. India stands committed to their welfare and legitimate rights and the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord of 1987 can be the basic document to forge ahead politically.

 -  A.S. Kalkat

Twenty years ago Sri Lanka’s President Ranatunge Premada-sa announced that his govern­ment and LTTE leader Velupillai Prabakaran had come together and demanded that the Indian Peace Keeping Force leave. A hundred thou­sand casualties and a shattered economy later, this week President Mahinda Raja-paksha issued an ultimatum to the LTTE to surrender or perish. Despite many voices in India and elsewhere sounding the alarm for over two years that a gigan­tic human tragedy was waiting to happen in Sri Lanka, it was allowed to happen notwithstanding the international com­munity and human rights organisations being aware of  it.

This article has long been under prep­aration, for nearly two years, but had to Wait out the time to see how the endgame would play out. The final showdown is in an area of 8 sq km immediately north of Mullaitivu designated as a No Fire Zone (NFZ). LTTE cadres of unknown strength are ranged against Sri Lankan forces. The presence of the LTTE leader, Prabakaran, is not confirmed, and he may or may not be there. The LTTE is fighting for its existence and the Sri Lanka forces are fighting for the survival of their coun­try’s sovereignty. Sandwiched between them are nearly 70,000 starving and long-suffering men, women, and children under inhuman conditions.

It may be the endgame for the LTTE and its supremo but it is certainly not the endgame for the Tamils of Sri Lanka. It will serve to remember that it was not Prabakaran who created the ethnic con­flict but the ethnic conflict that spawned a Prabakaran. If the cause of the ethnic conflict is not addressed, the end of the LTTE and its leader will be just a short-term victory.

Why  did the LTTE lose?

The first question one asks is: why did the LTTE lose? Ironically, Prabakaran and the LTTE have only themselves to blame for it. From their lofty claims in 1986 of protecting the Tamils against atrocities by the Sri Lankan forces, they descended into the predator preying on the same helpless Tamils. It soon became clear that Prabakaran’s goal was not the ballot box but the bullet box with the objective of carving out an autocratic Ee-lam of ‘AK 47’ dictatorship under him.

The LTTE alienated itself by its for­cible recruitment of men, women, and children; usurping the humanitarian aid meant for the devastated population; ex­tracting a ‘living tax’ from the poverty-stricken population; and brutal killings of Tamils who opposed its demand. The truth that LTTE is a ruthless killing ma­chine was evident as early as 1986 when, on the pretext of calling an all-party meeting in Batticaloa of militant leaders, Prabakaran decimated them in a night of the long knives. The only one to escape was K. Padmanabha, the EPRLF leader, who was later gunned down in Chennai.

As long as the LTTE confined itself to guerrilla warfare and terrorism, it was able to bleed Sri Lankan forces and the country’s economy. Its successes in 2005 and 2006 went to its head, resulting in its losing the focus of a guerrilla force. Pra­bakaran thought that he had achieved Eelam in the North-Eastern Province and the LTTE usurped the trappings of a sovereign ‘state’ with Prabhakaran as ‘head’ of state. He established the state ‘capital’ at Killinochchi; created depart­ments emulating government depart­ments, imposing taxes, dispensing ‘justice’, and issuing ‘travel documents’; and pretended that his armed cadres were the regular army, navy, and air force. Then either due to arrogance or over-confidence, Prabakaran made the blunder of taking on a regular army and tried to fight like one, with disastrous consequences. The LTTE was fighting outside its core competence. This was the undoing of a guerrilla and terrorist orga­nisation, which thought it had suddenly become a regular army.

1987 breakthrough

The irony of all this is that the statu­tory arrangement to secure the welfare and interests of the Sri Lankan Tamils was served on a plate by India in 1987 and put into effect by December 1988. Pra­bakaran and the LTTE chose to reject it because he had a different agenda and the concept of democracy was certainly not part of it. The India-Sri Lanka Agreement of July 1987 and Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) operations had ensured the enactment of the 13th Amendment to the Constitution — a giant step in devolution of power to the Northern and Eastern Provinces, resulting in their merger as a single Tamil-majority North-Eastern Province, which had always been the Ta­mil dream for their ‘traditional home­land.’ Today obtaining even half that dispensation will be difficult: the North­ern and Eastern Provinces have since been de-merged, the status and powers of provincial Chief Ministers have been se­verely constricted, and consequently provincial autonomy has already been compromised.

The question now is: what are India’s options and how should it proceed, keep­ing in mind that we can ‘stress,’ ‘insist,’ and ‘demand’ - but cannot enforce the solution. It is critical for both govern­ments that they not lose their focus. In­dia’s objective has always has been to ensure the welfare and legitimate rights of the Tamil minority within a united Sri Lanka and it stands committed to this goal. India has no commitment to any militant organisation or leader and the LTTE’s claim to represent all the Tamils of Sri Lanka is just a canard.

Way forward

The reality is that military force alone cannot defeat the adversary. Simultane­ous political, economic, and societal ini­tiatives are necessary to end the conflict. For the Tamils, their political future re­mains a question mark depending on President Rajapaksa’s ability to fulfil their legitimate demands. Although he has indicated every intention to do so, his ability to deliver is limited due to opposi­tion from hard-line Sinhala chauvinists, including those within his party, to en­acting the necessary legislation. It is like­ly he will go in for a general election to get the necessary numbers of his supporters elected before taking the next major po­litical step.

Sri Lanka’s concerns over its territo­rial integrity and sovereignty are well founded, as are India’s concerns over the security environment in its backyard and the sentiments of its own 60 million-plus Tamils. The leaders of both countries have displayed remarkable restraint and maturity in managing the situation. The time has now come to bell the cat. Un­fortunately, there is not even a draft po­litical proposal on the table to kick-start the dialogue. In this political vacuum, the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord of 1987 can serve as the basic document to begin the politi­cal dialogue and since it has been passed by parliaments of both countries and placed on the floor of the United Nations it cannot be labelled as unilateral or discriminatory.

India must now demand that: (i) the LTTE lay down arms and release the ci­vilians in the No Fire Zone, (ii) the Sri Lankan government order a ceasefire and undertake a crash rehabilitation pro­gramme, (iii) the Sri Lankan government initiate a political dialogue with the Sri Lankan Tamil leaders for a practical and lasting dispensation to meet the legiti­mate Tamil demands. India must asso­ciate itself as an observer in the political dialogue but it must be kept in mind that only the government of a country can give dispensation to its citizens, not an outside power.

It could be a coincidence that whenev­er India has been confronted with a crisis situation in relation to Sri Lanka — as in 1989 when President Premadasa de­manded recall of the IPKF or in 2008 when President Rajapaksa decided on full-fledged military operations against the LTTE - the timing has been surreal, coinciding with the run-up to general elections in India. However, it is no coin­cidence that our political parties have not hesitated to use it as a card in domestic electoral politics. Today with the grave threat of global terror confronting us, the dangers are very great and the stakes too high for anyone to play any kind of politi­cal cards.

(Lieutenant - General (retd.) AS. Kal-katis Director Emeritus, Centre for Joint Warfare Studies, New Delhi. He is a for­mer  Army Commander and was the IPKF Chief. His email id is kalkat@vsnl.com)

Thanks : The Hindu 27.04.2009