LTTE international network: The next major challenge

By Shanaka Jayasekara

Associate Lecturer,

Centre for Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism (PICT)

Macquarie University,Sydney, Australia.

The Sri Lankan military has destroyed the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) as a conventional military force. Deprived of territory, the separatist group has no choice but to revert to unconventional guerrilla warfare and terrorist tactics. The LTTE's ability to continue its violent campaign for an ethnic Tamil state in Sri Lanka depends largely on the survival of its autocratic leader, Velupillai Prabhakaran, and the group's ability to maintain its international fundraising network.

In recent years, the LTTE has been one of the world's most successful conventional military rebel groups, having put much emphasis on developing ground, maritime and even air forces that matched its ambition of establishing an independent state. The groupcontrol of larges swathes of territory in the north and east of Sri Lanka was key to developing its conventional military forces, providing the necessary permissive environment and resources.

When the LTTE entered into a ceasefire agreement with the Sri Lanka government in February 2002, the group was left in control of much of the Northern and Eastern Provinces, although the city of Jaffna, the capital of a putative Tamil state, remained in government hands. Having stretched its military campaign to the extreme, the LTTE looked to consolidate its position.

The ceasefire agreement provided an opportunity to pursue two primary objectives: the procurement of new weaponry and reinventing its international profile. In the aftermath of the 11 September 2001 attacks on the US, the LTTE needed to shake off its association with terrorism, which inhibited its fundraising activities among the Tamil diaspora in North America and Europe. Having set about building diplomatic interactions to rival that of the Sri Lankan state, the LTTE successfully established close links with key European governments, with the help of Norwegian interlocutors.

Strategic miscalculations

The LTTE made critical miscalculations during the ceasefire. One was its decision to enforce a boycott of the November 2005 presidential election to deprive the United National Party (UNP) of Tamil votes. The group decided that the UNP, with its close links to global liberal-conservative politics, would be an obstacle to the group's ambitions, while the rival Freedom Party (SLFP), allied to nationalist parties, was more likely to fall out with the international community and help boost the LTTE's legitimacy in the West.

The boycott ensured that the SLFP's Mahinda Rajapakse won the presidency. However, with its chosen candidate in power, events started to turn against the LTTE.

In a surprise move, Mahinda Rajapakse appointed his brother as secretary of defence. A retired army colonel who lived in the United States, Gotabaya Rajapakse had played no public role in Sri Lanka's affairs before his appointment. Consequently, the LTTE probably ruled him out as a possible defence secretary and failed to pre-empt his appointment with an assassination attempt, as it did in the case of Major General (retired) Lakshman Algama, who was killed by a LTTE suicide bomber in 1999.

Realising its error, the LTTE attempted to assassinate Gotabaya on 1 December 2005, when a suicide bomber drove an auto-rickshaw into his motorcade. However, the bombing failed to kill the new defence secretary, who subsequently became the LTTE's most implacable foe.

The military strategy developed by Gotabaya was based on three elements: a troop surge by increasing the strength of the security forces by 40 per cent over a two-year period; targeting the LTTE's weapons supply chain, most notably by sinking seven merchant vessels that regularly shipped clandestine cargo to the rebels; and a significant improvement in operational co-ordination between the Sri Lankan Army, Navy and Air Force. The Sri Lankan military also introduced advanced firepower and technical capabilities such as four F-7GS fighter aircraft. This process was helped by the new defence secretary's close relationship with the president, who on several occasions contacted foreign heads of government to iron out defence procurement difficulties.

Losing the battle

The ceasefire effectively collapsed in 2006, when talks stalled and skirmishes escalated into an all-out offensive against the LTTE in the Eastern Province. With the additional resources and close support from the air force and the navy, Sri Lankan ground forces overran the LTTE in the east by January 2007. This allowed the military to focus almost entirely on the rebel strongholds in the north from February 2007. Although the Sri Lankan government has only issued highly selective casualty figures, reports suggest there has been extremely fierce fighting over the past two years, with losses numbering in the thousands on both sides in the northern campaign.

Nonetheless, the military has continued to make steady progress, with a series of positions and town overrun in 2007 and 2008. The campaign culminated in the fall of the LTTE's administrative capital Kilinochchi, its naval headquarters, Mullaittivu and the strategic Elephant Pass in January 2009. The rebels are now confined to a small area in Mullaittivu district on the northeast coast, with no significant population centres under their control. Many have taken refuge in 'safe zones' that the Sri Lankan security forces have demarcated for displaced civilians. The first 35 km2 safe zone was established north of the A35 highway between the townships of Visuamadu and Puthukkudiyiruppu. The security forces dropped leaflets informing the estimated 150,000 civilians trapped in the remnants of rebel territory that they would not be fired on if they moved to this area.

On 12 February, the security forces re-designated a new safe zone on the coast near Velanayanmadam north of Mullaittivu, forcing the displaced civilians and the LTTE hiding in their midst to relocate. This move seems to have been designed to deprive the LTTE of the weapons it buried in the first safe zone. The LTTE made desperate efforts to recover its weapons as the civilian population left. However, the security forces moved in within 48 hours of announcing the new safe zone and managed to recover large stocks of weapons and ammunition, including two Chinese Type 59-1 130 mm artillery guns buried 3 m underground.

The government has accused the LTTE of forcing civilians to work and shooting at those attempting to leave. The LTTE has accused the military of indiscriminately shelling the safe zone. The military is also holding all the civilians who manage to flee the fighting in transit camps for fear that some are LTTE fighters.

Chain of command

Defeated on the battlefield, the LTTE has little choice but to transform itself back into a guerrilla group. This will involve an extensive re-organisation of its current structure, which mirrors that of a conventional military with high-profile commanders. Deprived of territory, it will need new anonymous commanders to lead its guerrilla war. LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran is consequently likely to task less well-known individuals with setting up regional command structures in areas now controlled by the government.

The LTTE's ability to wage guerrilla warfare as a unified entity and with a cohesive strategy will depend largely on the survival of the all-powerful Prabhakaran. The LTTE leader has never tolerated rivals. He ruthlessly wiped out the leadership of other Tamil militant groups in the mid-1980s and has only once appointed a deputy leader of the LTTE to fill in while he visited Rajiv Gandhi in India in 1987. That deputy leader, Gopalaswamy Mahendraraja (alias Mahatthaya), was subsequently sidelined and eventually executed in 1994.

Prabhakaran has instead surrounded himself with a number of key commanders, all of whom are considered to be on an equal standing in the organisation. The one possible exception is Pottu Amman, the group's intelligence chief, who is accorded a special standing but may not have the confidence of other senior commanders.

With no clear successor [his only son, Charles Anthony, is only 22 and despite heading the group's air unit and technology unit may still be considered too young for overall leadership], Prabhakaran's elimination would almost certainly create a power struggle that would further weaken the LTTE. The group could even collapse as a structured hierarchical entity and splinter into rival factions. This could lead to a period of infighting between Tamil separatists, similar to that seen in the early 1980s.

Given the importance of eliminating Prabhakaran, the Sri Lankan security forces have established a dedicated unit of technical experts and special forces to track him down. The military believes he and several senior commanders and their families are hiding with Mahaveer sympathisers in the new civilian safe zone. Consisting of LTTE veterans and their families, the Mahaveer (meaning great warriors or heroes in Tamil) are supported by a welfare structure headed by a senior leader. The Mahaveer receive financial and material benefits from the LTTE and reciprocate by manning support services for the group. Given the ambiguity of their status, the security forces have a difficult task separating Mahaveer from the general civilian population in the safe zone.

However, it will be extremely difficult for Prabhakaran to remain undetected within the safe zone for long, especially if he is camped with other high-profile LTTE commanders. He could escape overseas, where he could still provide inspirational leadership from exile, but there are doubts as to whether the LTTE can endure a non-resident command and control structure. As a result, he is likely to attempt to evade capture in Sri Lanka, possibly by moving about in Mullaittivu jungles.

International network

Another key figure in any post-Prabhakan scenario, would be the controller of the LTTE's funding network. Despite the Tamil Tigers' fundraising having suffered significantly from the prohibition of the group by Canada and the EU in 2006 (following similar bans by India in 1992, the US in 1997 and the UK in 2001), the remaining diaspora fund networks will be vital to the group's survival and any possible revitalisation.

In January, that responsibility was given to Selvarasa Pathmanathan (alias Kumaran Pathmanathan or KP), the former chief of the LTTE's weapons procurement operations who is wanted by several foreign law enforcement agencies and subject to an Interpol warrant. This fugitive status means he is not in a position to undertake political lobbying or lead public campaigns even though he is based in Thailand. Nonetheless, Prabakaran's decision to appoint a fugitive to head international fundraising operations indicates that he has prioritised the safeguarding of the LTTE's financial assets and procurement networks above public relations.

KP will have to take over much of the financial management previously performed by the LTTE leadership in Sri Lanka. Under Veerakathy Manivannam (alias Castro) the LTTE's International Secretariat set targets and deadlines for fundraising and propaganda activity. The management of finances and assets was controlled by Thamilenthi, the head of the LTTE finance wing. All overseas operations had to be explicitly sanctioned by Kilinochchi. The LTTE will no longer be able to enforce such tight control over the international network.

The extent to which the network fragments after the LTTE's defeat on the battlefield remains debatable. Most of the group's overseas offices are controlled by confidants or family members of the LTTE leadership who should remain loyal. However, their ability to dominate the diaspora and coerce donations is likely to decline in the wake of the defeat as many expatriate Tamils may now view the collective millions of dollars they have contributed to the 'Tamil Eelam project' as squandered money. As a result, rival diaspora groups that previously feared retaliation from LTTE activists are likely to become bolder and some of the companies set up with LTTE venture capital may take the opportunity to distance themselves from the group.

In the short term, KP will focus on taking control of all financial deposits the LTTE keeps in various secret accounts rather than on introducing operational changes. He will also have to watch the controller of overseas finance closely. This responsibility has been with a senior LTTE activist using the aliases Sana and Chandru, who is last known to be operating from the Netherlands.

However, KP should be able to secure the group's most important assets, including its shipping operation. The group has four remaining merchant vessels, according to Jane's sources, that will continue commercial shipping under the two companies registered in Panama and Bahamas. This activity is run by cadres known as Nehrujee in the UK and Raja Ananda in the Philippines. The role of Bhavanitharan, the key liaison between the shipping fleet and the procurement division, is unclear after his departure from Indonesia in 2008. It is possible that KP may give him a more active role in the shipping operation.

Propaganda networks

Satellite television broadcasts are another crucial area of the LTTE's overseas operations as they are the best way of reaching the Tamil diaspora in Europe and North America. However, the group suffered a major setback on March 2007, when the French authorities shut down the Tamil Television Network (TTN). Attempts to relocate the satellite channel to Italy, Serbia and Israel have all been blocked. The Sri Lankan authorities suspect that the LTTE has purchased a licence previously used by a Nepalese satellite channel to facilitate the recommencement of its European satellite channel. However, the channel will need to find new content as the daily news bulletin provided by the LTTE from Kilinochchi will no longer be available.

Nonetheless, a satellite channel would help shore up the LTTE's diaspora support base and international fundraising activity. That the Tigers have been eager to pursue a satellite broadcasting capability was demonstrated by the capture of the LTTE's communications centre by the Sri Lankan army's 1st Division in late Februray. The troops dicsovered computers, accessories, switches, telephones and satellite dishes at the site west of the Tiger's last town of Puthukkudiyiruppu.The money will be used to re-organise the group into an underground guerrilla force that will continue to present a threat, especially to Tamils who talk to the government.

Tiger futures

The LTTE has undoubtedly suffered a punishing military campaign since 2006, losing the vast majority of its territory, all population centres, its administrative and naval headquarters, nascent air force, armaments depots and thousands of cadres. Nonetheless, the organisation currently remains a united force of several thousand members, still determined to fight for Tamil independence.

If Prabhakaran is exiled or killed, the LTTE may struggle to survive as a unified entity. In this scenario, the factionalisation of the Tamil Tigers would encourage intra-Tamil violence, weakening the independence movement and diminishing the levels of violence directed against security forces. However, Prabhakaran has evaded capture by the security forces for three decades, and even in the case of his demise the history of the Tigers' insurgency may override competing factors and allow a single leader to direct the organisation. In this more likely scenario, the LTTE will turn its attention to guerrilla warfare, particularly in the Eastern Province, attacking security forces and Tamil organisations and individuals pliant to the government's agenda. In addition, terrorist attacks are likely in the capital Colombo, as well as sporadic suicide attacks on major armed forces' bases.

For the foreseeable future, therefore, the LTTE will remain a guerrilla organisation, unable to control swathes of territory but remaining a significant insurgent threat to the government.

Change in India

In the past, the LTTE has enjoyed both popular and political support from Indian Tamils. The support for the LTTE since the late 1990s dwindled in Tamil Nadu and is now the preserve of fringe political activists. Neither of the two main political parties in Tamil Nadu made any noticeable reference to the LTTE in the state elections held in May 2006. As the Sri Lankan military advance reached the outskirts of Kilinochchi, the LTTE could only mobilise the fringe parties in Tamil Nadu to protest against the offensive. It was only when the humanitarian situation worsened that the Tamil Nadu state assembly, led by Chief Minister Muthuvel Karunanidhi, issued futile ultimatum without much conviction.

Even with Tamil Nadu support, the LTTE would have struggled to find much sympathy in the current Congress-led Indian government. The Congress Party is led by Sonia Gandhi, the widow of former Indian prime minister Rajiv Gandhi, who was assassinated by the LTTE in May 1991 when a suicide bomber detonated herself at an election rally in Tamil Nadu.

The LTTE was also growing into a regional threat by developing its maritime and aviation capabilities. The presence of unsupervised clandestine airstrips and unregulated air traffic became a threat to Indian security and commercial aviation in the region. The security of the sea lanes also emerged as a major concern after the LTTE seized the MV Farah III , a Jordanian vessel transporting Indian rice that ran aground off the coast of Mullaittivu in December 2006.

Given these factors, and India's dire experience of direct intervention in Sri Lanka with the Indian Peacekeeping Force between 1987 and 1990, New Delhi adopted a policy of non-intervention in the 1990s and 2000 that effectively gave the Sri Lankan security forces a window of opportunity to pursue its campaign against the LTTE without external interference.

The LTTE may now be hoping that the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) wins the Indian elections in May 2009 and forces a ceasefire agreement on Sri Lanka. However, there is no guarantee that the BJP will be much more sympathetic to the LTTE than the Congress Party. At the same time, the Sri Lankan government will be extremely reluctant to accept any ceasefire that gives the LTTE a chance of surviving as a territorial entity.

(This article was published in the Jane's Intelligence Review on 11 March 2009)

Courtesy: The Island