This is indian Intelligence analysis on recent situation.This shows LTTE and SL govt true situation
Any one interested in SL/LTTE need to read this carefully

Eelam War IV: Imminent End
Ajit Kumar Singh
Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management

Mullaitivu Town, situated in a narrow stretch of land between the Nanthikandal lagoon and the Indian Ocean, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam’s (LTTE) ‘military capital’ as well as the strongest Sea Tiger (sea wing of the LTTE) base, and the last of the urban settlements under the Tiger’s control, was captured by troops of the 59^th Division in the afternoon of January 25, 2009, heralding the imminent termination of "Eelam War IV", which began with the Mavil Aru operation in July 2006.

With the fall of Mullaitivu, the Tiger’s lost their ‘Kingdom’. Earlier, on January 2, 2009, the Sri Lanka Army (SLA) had overrun Kilinochchi Town , the de facto capital of the projected Tamil Eelam (Homeland). Mullaitivu had been under LTTE control for a span of 13 years, since July 18, 1996, when the LTTE had swarmed over the last Army camp there in what was to go down in Sri Lanka’s military history as a major debacles, in which more than 1,000 soldiers were killed and a large haul of weapons, including long range artillery and mortars, was lost to the Tigers.

In the evening of January 25, 2008, in an interview on State-run television Rupavahini, the Army chief, Lieutenant General Sarath Fonseka, announced that the Army had "captured the Mullaitivu bastion completely today," adding, that the fighting was continuing elsewhere and that the war was "95 percent" over.

In the build-up to the Mullaitivu victory, the SLA had, on January 9, 2009, ‘fully liberated’ the 325 kilometres stretch of Jaffna-Kandy (A-9) road, which the LTTE had held for 23 years, reuniting Point Pedro, the northernmost tip of the country, with Dondra Head, the southernmost tip. The longitudinal distance between these two small towns is 480 kilometres.

The Tigers had lost Paranthan, Elephant Pass and Jaffna over the preceding two and a half months culminating in the fall of Pooneryn on November 15, 2008. Prior to these victories in the LTTE heartland the Security Forces (SFs) had crushed the Tigers in Vavuniya and Mannar Districts.

According to media sources, the remnants of ‘Eelam War IV’ are now being fought in a territory less than 300 square kilometres on the Eastern coast, where the Sri Lanka Navy (SLN) has set up a massive blockade. In an interview broadcast on January 6, 2009, General Fonseka told Independent Television Network that "the LTTE not only lost 95 per cent of the land it held but also lost within the last one year 8,000 terrorists, out of whom the Sri Lanka Army knows the names of 4000." He boasted that the victory in the Northern Province was much greater than that in the East Province , since the Army had to enter only a 20 kilometre distance in the Eastern battles, while the distance recovered in the North was 89 kilometres. Later on January 17, 2009, General Fonseka said, "When the war started, I used 50 map sheets to plan it. Now I only need one sheet to plan it."

Meanwhile, the Human Rights and Disaster Management Minister Mahinda Samarasinghe, in a press briefing on January 30, 2009, rejected calls for a Cease-Fire Agreement (CFA), stressing, "We will continue with our military operations and we will continue to liberate areas which had not been liberated so far. We are determined to eradicate terrorism in Sri Lanka .'' Earlier, on January 29, President Mahinda Rajapakse urged the LTTE to ‘release’ all civilians in the conflict area within 48 hours to allow them to move to safety in the Government controlled areas. The Government has set up a special ‘no-fire zone’ in the LTTE-held area. However, the LTTE rejected the call, with LTTE political leader, Balasingham Nadesan declaring on January 29 that, "Only a permanent ceasefire mooted by the international community and negotiations followed by it would resolve the conflict as envisaged by the Tamil people and the LTTE."

The SF’s triumph in Wanni and Jaffna in 2009 was the extension of the Government troop’s successful operations over the years 2006, 2007 and 2008.

The relentless multi prong assault of the military exhausted the Tigers, and on June 30, 2008, the Army Chief had already noted that the LTTE has "lost their capability of fighting as a conventional army". The Sri Lanka Air Force carried out a relentless succession of air raids on identified LTTE targets almost every day, to weaken the Tiger’s military establishment prior to the ground troop’s assault. The SLN simultaneously neutralised the prowess of the Sea Tigers (arguably the most lethal wing of the organisation) in 25 major clashes in the Sea, cutting the LTTE’s supply routes and opening up alternative routes for advancing troops in North. In the early stages, the Army had adopted a policy of inflicting damage on the outfit, rather than any effort to recover land.

To sustain its onslaught and maintain dominance in recovered areas, the Army had deployed a total of 50,000 soldiers on the war front, and had backed this with a recruitment drive, adding 15,000 soldiers to its Forces in 2008, over the 30,000 recruited in the preceding year. The Army’s recruitment got a boost as the SFs secured increasing dominance on the war front, and as the myth of the LTTE’s ferocity and invincibility receded. General Sarath Fonseka, on January 13, 2009, thus stated, "Today the Army is strong with 180,000 personnel, where as a few years ago, we had just 116,000 people. We elevated ourselves not just with manpower but with well trained, sharp and skilled professionals." According to a November 17, 2008, report moreover, Sri Lanka Police sources disclosed that plans were underway to set up Police Stations in recently captured areas in the Northern Province , as had been done earlier in the Eastern Province . Under this scheme, reports indicate, a new Police Station was to be set up in Pooneryn, the strategic point in north-western coast captured by the Army on November 15, 2008.

The LTTE, on the other hand, was finding it increasingly difficult to replenish its shrinking cadre base. On June 6, 2008, in a release by its "Hero’s department", the LTTE claimed that the outfit had lost 21,051 cadres, including 16,516 males and 4,535 females, in the quest for a separate State for the Tamils in Sri Lanka, over 26 years between November 27, 1982 and May 31, 2008. Since its defeat in the Eastern Province in July 2007, the Tiger’s attempts to replenish cadre strength by coercive conscription had failed in the East, the principal source of earlier recruitment. According to one November 3, 2008, report, the LTTE was paying SLR 25,000 to parents who permitted one of their children to join the organization. Accoridng to a November 22, 2008, report, the University Teachers for Human Rights ( Jaffna ), quoting sources from the Wanni, claimed that, since early September 2008, the LTTE had conscripted 9,000 ‘very young’ persons. The LTTE also directed over 8,000 students who sat for the GCE ‘O Level’ Examinations in the Kilinochchi and Mullaitivu Districts to join combat training, according to military intelligence reports released on December 24, 2008.

Mounting international pressure added to the LTTEs woes. New Delhi ’s policy of non-interference, allowing Colombo to pursue its agenda of wiping out the LTTE menace in accordance with the international community’s current policy of ‘zero tolerance towards terrorism’ helped the Mahinda Government. The November 26, 2008, multiple terrorist attacks in Mumbai forced India to stick with this policy, despite the political compulsions of the Government at New Delhi . The actions taken against the LTTE network by Governments the world over, were a result of an increasing commitment to support Colombo . Thus, responding to requests made to the international community by the Sri Lanka Government for assistance in destroying the LTTE Air Wing which continued to attack Government installations throughout 2007-2008, Russia and the Czech Republic announced that they would help Colombo destroy the small aircrafts of the LTTE’s air wing, according to a November 2, 2008, report. All this happened despite the desperate efforts of the branches of the LTTE’s political wing in at least 12 countries, including the United States .

Facing an ‘open war’ since January 16, 2008, the year turned out to be the bloodiest in the history of 33 years of ethnic strife in the island nation, with a minimum of 11,144 people killed through the year in about 1,200 major incidents [incidents in which at least three persons have been killed], including 13 suicide attacks. The dead included at least 404 civilians – including top politicians and ministers – 1,314 SF personnel and 9,426 LTTE militants, including top leaders of the outfit.

* Data till February 1, 2009; ** Data from March 1, 2000
Source SATP Database

Fatality figures from the conflict zones – Northern and Eastern Provinces in the years 2006, 2007, 2008 – may, in fact, reflect gross underestimates, as there has been only fitful release of information by Government agencies and media reports. Accurate estimation became even more difficult after the Ministry of Defence, which used to release regular data about the fatalities, suspended the release of casualty figures after October 24, 2008. Contradictory figures put out by different Government agencies from time to time made matters worse. While Sarath Fonseka, on January 6, 2009, stated that nearly 15,000 LTTE militants had been killed by the SFs over the past two-and-a-half years and nearly 2,000 SF personnel lost their lives over the same period, Defence spokesperson Keheliya Rambukwella asserted, on January 11, 2009, that some 3,000 soldiers had been killed in battles with the LTTE over the preceding three months, and not 15,000, as had been alleged by Opposition parties. Similarly, in the case of civilian fatalities, the Government repeatedly insisted that it was adhering to a policy of Zero Civilian Casualties in the battlefield and that there had been minimal collateral fatalities. It is, however, beyond debate that the loss of life among the civilians has been considerable, though it may not be as high as the LTTE claim of nearly 3,000 civilians killed.

While deadly fighting ensued in the North, the Eastern Province (EP) also felt the heat of LTTE terrorism, with 199 persons killed through 2008 in as many as 194 incidents of violence since May 16, 2008, when the Provincial Government was installed. Ethnic clashes between Muslims and Tamils, which erupted soon after the appointment of Sivanesathurai Chandrakanthan alias Pillayan, the leader of the Tamileela Makkal Viduthalai Puligal (TMVP), as Chief Minister (CM), further vitiated the atmosphere in the East. Notably, on September 23, 2008, US Ambassador Robert Blake said abductions and extra-judicial killings and other security challenges must end in the Eastern Province , if private sector investments to develop the region were to be taken forward. On December 14, 2008, military sources claimed that 21 LTTE militants led by Nagulan, a former LTTE leader in the East, had infiltrated into the Province with the objective of destabilising the security situation. Four militants who had been killed by the troops in Bakmitiyawa in Ampara on December 8, 2008, was said to have belonged to this group. Earlier, on November 17, 2008, sources indicated that some 70 TMVP – the political wing of the LTTE breakaway faction founded by Vinayagamoorthy Muraleetharan alias ‘Colonel’ Karuna Amman – cadres had defected to rejoin the LTTE over the preceding months. Some of these cadres killed their colleagues prior to fleeing to join the LTTE.

The Eastern Province plunged into chaos despite elections to the Eastern Provincial Council (EPC) on May 10, 2008 and appointment of Pillayan as the first ever Chief Minister of the EPC on May 16, 2008, as part of the Government’s efforts to democratise the East. Prior to the EPC elections, the Batticaloa local body polls had been held on March 10, 2008. With democracy returning to the Province, it was expected that the security scenario would improve, as would overall development. Things, however, went awry when Karuna returned to Colombo on July 3, 2008. The simmering intra-party rivalry between the Karuna and Pillayan factions reached climax when, on December 21, 2008, Karuna formed a new party named Tamileela Makkal Viduthalai Koddani (TMVK) or the Tamil People’s Liberation Alliance. A worried Colombo , on its part, tried to play safe by appointing Karuna as a Member of Parliament representing the ruing United People's Freedom Alliance (UPFA), on October 5, 2008. However, on November 23, 2008, Pillayan claimed that that, since he took office, not a single person had been recruited to the Council. "I don’t have any powers to implement the 13th Amendment. We have asked the Central Government to give us the powers vested in the 13th Amendment," he said, accusing Karuna of having convinced Colombo not to delegate powers to him.

Nevertheless, on November 12, 2008, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees disclosed that more than 150,000 Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) had returned to their former villages in the Eastern Province over the preceding year. Later on December 3, 2008, the Project Manager of Humanitarian De-mining Unit, Imthiyas Ismail, stated that landmines had been removed from a 17 billion square metre area in the ‘liberated areas’, including the recently liberated Eastern Province. The Province received a boost when the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), on April 15, 2008, announced that it had awarded a five-year USD 12 million contract to support regional Government in Sri Lanka 's Eastern and North Central Provinces .

Outside the conflict zones of the North and East the LTTE continued to carry out strikes, killing 110 persons in as many as 71 incidents in just the Capital Colombo and its suburbs. Reports indicate that at least 14 suicide cadres were present in Colombo to carry out attacks on the occasion of the country’s Independence Day (February 4). In October 2008, the Government had created a Special Police Task Force to protect Colombo and its suburbs from possible terrorist attacks.

The LTTE is reported to have carried out 168 suicide attacks between 1984 and 2006 – the highest number of suicide attacks by any terrorist organisation in the world during this period – and assassinated 3,262 civilians in 346 targeted attacks across the country. In 2008 alone, the LTTE killed as many as 158 persons in not less that 90 incidents outside the war zone. Intelligence reports indicate that Kandy and its suburbs were identified as the second worst affected area after Colombo , outside the theatre of war. Suicide squads of 11 LTTE militants were reportedly living in the Kandy area. According to a November 2008 report, Police in the Kandy , Matale and Nuwara Eliya areas recovered about 500-kilograms of C4 explosives from a group of LTTE militants. Another LTTE militant caught transporting a large quantity of explosives by lorry admitted to previously transporting some 1,000-kilograms of explosives to Kandy , Matale and Nuwara Eliya. On December 23, 2008, the Inspector General of Police, Jayantha Wickramarathna, revealed that the SFs had seized approximately 4,350 kilograms of C-4 and TNT explosives in the southern areas in 2008.

The media has also been confronted by the tribulations of war. Chief Government Whip, Dinesh Gunawardena, on January 21, 2009, disclosed in Parliament that nine journalists had been killed and another 27 assaulted in Sri Lanka since January 2006. He also indicated that, during this period, five journalists had been abducted by ‘unidentified groups’ in the country, though four of these were found later. On June 4, 2008, the Defence Ministry formulated guidelines for the media on war news coverage in the form of an advisory that was posted on its website,www.defence.lk

On November 2, 2008, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) said that Sri Lanka ’s war-battered economy, with an overvalued currency, reliance on foreign borrowings and poor management of the budget, was at "serious risk". In its annual assessment, the IMF stated that Sri Lanka could have inflation at 23.9 per cent by the end of 2008. Economic growth was expected to slow down from 6.8 percent in 2007, to 6.1 per cent in 2008 and 5.8 per cent in 2009. The Island nation's foreign reserves have fallen from USD 3.4 billion in July to USD 2.6 billion dollars by October 2008, as the Central Bank spent hundreds of millions of dollars since September, in a bid to shore up the Sri Lankan Rupee. One October 2008 report indicated that, under these adverse circumstances, the Government spent SLR 6,840 per minute in the war over the preceding months, and subsequently increasing this expenditure to SLR 18,000 per minute.

On the political front, in addition to the EPC elections, the Government successfully conducted elections for another two Provincial Councils – the North Central Provincial Council and the Sabaragamuwa Provincial Council – on August 23, 2008. Later, on September 4, 2008, President Rajapakse asserted that his Government would shortly move towards establishing a ninth Provincial Council: "When we came into power there were only seven Provincial Councils functioning in the country. We have now increased it up to eight. We would establish the ninth Provincial Council shortly." On December 8, 2008, the Government, in a special gazette notification, dissolved the North Western and the Central Provincial Councils where elections are scheduled to be held on February 14, 2009. Terms for both these Provincial Councils were to end in August 2009. According to a January 15, 2009, report the Government was is even considering the holding of local Government elections in Jaffna and Kilinochchi Districts before the Sinhala and Hindu New Year in April 2009. No elections have been held in the region since 1997.

The long sought-after Southern Consensus remained elusive. Even the All Party Representative Committee (APRC) mandated by the President in 2006 to prepare a set of proposals that would be the basis for a solution to the ‘national question’ has managed to get representations from only 13 political parties out of more than 58 recognized by the election commission. The prominent absentees include the main opposition United National Party, the Marxist Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna or People's Liberation Front and the Tamil National Alliance. Only two parties from the Opposition – the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress and the Western People's Front led by parliamentarian Mano Ganeshan – have made representations. Nevertheless, the APRC has finalized its report recommending a power devolution formula to solve the issue of ethnic conflict in the country. The Committee concluded its deliberations in the night of January 31, 2008, after its 104^th meeting. APRC chairman and Minister, Prof. Tissa Vitharana, stated that all 13 parties in the APRC attended the final meeting. An interim report based on the consensus reached so far has been handed over to party representatives for observations and suggestions. Once the report is finalized by the 13 parties, it is to be handed over to the President. The APRC is expected to meet again on February 16 and 17 to take a final decision on the plan

On January 7, 2009, the Government confirmed that the Cabinet had taken a unanimous decision, in accordance with a memorandum submitted by the President, to proscribe the LTTE, which continued to engage in blatant human rights violations. The LTTE had been described by the Federal Bureau of Investigation as one of the most dangerous and deadly extremist outfits in the world, which had ‘inspired’ networks worldwide, including al-Qaeda in Iraq . The LTTE had also been listed as one among six blatant violators of human rights by the United Nations, for recruiting underage children in armed conflict and using rape and other forms of sexual violence against them. According to a December 10, 2008, report, the Government had ‘overwhelming public support’ for its war against the LTTE and most people believed the outfit would soon be defeated, an opinion poll indicated. Research group, Taylor Nelson Sofres (Lanka), claimed that close to 75 per cent of people questioned stated they were "firmly in favour of military action, seeing it as the only route to wipe out terrorism."

Even though the end of military operations appears imminent, the scourge of the LTTE is expected to survive for some time to come. The Jane’s Intelligence Report indicated that the LTTE's annual income was estimated "between $200-300 million, making it the second biggest income generating terrorist organisation in the world." Another December 2008 report claimed that, despite stringent measures to freeze funds, the Tamils Rehabilitation Organization (TRO), a LTTE front organisation, reportedly raised over SLR 60 million in August 2008 alone. Earlier, on November 17-18, 2008, the Central Bank had announced that it had forfeited SLR 71 million belonging to TRO to the State. [The Government had confiscated TRO assets in August 2006 under the Financial Transactions Reporting Act and the Convention on the Suppression of Terrorist Financing Act.]

In July 2008, Foreign Secretary Palitha Kohona had stated that the LTTE could wage a protracted low-intensity insurgency with hidden resources, despite a clear military victory. "Defeating the LTTE might not be the end of the story because an organisation like this might still have some resources hidden away. This might continue to be a problem for us. So the way we are trying to resolve this problem is... by a combination of military and political means." Army Commander General Fonseka had added, ominously, on September 18, 2008, that the LTTE would go underground rather than 'fight to the last man' in open war.

This danger would remain particularly acute if the elusive LTTE leadership, including Velupillai Prabhakaran, survives the present military confrontation. It will remain difficult to wipe out the LTTE if Prabhakaran survives in freedom. Contradictory reports regarding his location – some analysts claim he might already have fled to some south-east Asian country, while others claim he is still leading the fight in the Mullaitivu area – add to these anxieties.

Uncertainty continues, consequently, to loom large over Colombo . Until the present military operations do not arrive at their logical conclusion, and the LTTE’s capacities for insurgent and terrorist operation are not entirely neutralised, the residual risks of violence in Sri Lanka will persist, even as a satisfactory resolution of the ethnic conflict would remain elusive.